


UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

SPECIAL LECTURES-25



VEDANTA: DELIGHT OF BEING

PROF. N. A. NIKAM

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NIK



PRASĀRĀNGA

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

1970

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We are extremely happy to present 'Vedanta: Delight of Being' to the public in the present form.

We are under a deep debt of gratitude to Prof. N. A. Nikam, former Vice-chancellor of the University of Mysore who kindly accepted our invitation to deliver a course of three talks and permitted us to publish them in this form.

PRABHU SHANKARA
Director

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PREFACE

The *Prasaranga*, Department of Lectures and Publications of the Mysore University, distinguishes between Extension Lectures and Special Lectures. In Extension Lectures, the Lecturers are not to 'extend' themselves, whereas, in the Special Lectures, they may display their special learning and their special ignorance. These are Special Lectures. They were delivered in the Department of Post-Graduate Studies in Philosophy of the Mysore University. The audience and the Room were appropriately small enough and close enough to receive the communication, as it were, of a Secret Doctrine. And the Campus of the Mysore University named *Manasa Gangotri* by the Poet is a place of confluence in the mind of Inspiration from above and Aspiration from below.

These Lectures should have been, in fact, delivered in 1968, but as I went again to the United States to teach, I was grateful when the Mysore University renewed its invitation after I returned, and permitted me to deliver the Lectures at leisure, one in December 1969, the other two in January and February of 1970. I **was** a student of Philosophy in the Mysore University: I *am* what I *was*. I have embodied in these lectures the analytical method of my Seminars in U.S.A. and defined Philosophy throughout as Inquiry leading to Dialogue: Inquiry is a dialogue with one's self.

Actually, one of the Lectures I delivered on 'The Idea of History in the Philosophy of Indian Culture' is not here as it is intended for publication elsewhere in a Symposium on Philosophy of History. To take its place,

I wrote another, 'Being and Delight of Being' to take its place, but which, in fact, I did not deliver. But the three that are here somehow form an integral whole as they are all based on three opposite methods of Inquiry. In the First Lecture I *distinguish* (distinguish between ignorance and ignorance, between question and question, etc.); in the Second I find equivalences and interpret 'is' as 'is the same as', and therefore say as the Upanisad does, that Truth 'is the same as' Good, and Good is the same as Truth; i.e. Truth is defined as 'is the same as', both as a relation and as a constituent in a relation; in the Third, I use the method of Implication, and inquire into the dialectical implication of a passage cited from the Upanisad. Although I have commented on this passage before I seem to get new insights whenever I read it anew, and so, my writing is often a re-thinking of what was thought before but which is not, always, the same as before, and so, a dialogue within myself, in which, if there is not any progress, there is at all events some change of thought or perspective. In a tradition where all 'birth' is 're-birth', it is consistent that thinking is also a *re*-thinking.

As much of my writing is a re-thinking of what I thought or wrote, I am involved in the pleasant obligation to make my acknowledgements, and so, I acknowledge my obligations to the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, which published my book: *Some Concepts of Indian Culture*; for, the Second and the Third Lectures recapitulate what I wrote in my book but examine the same afresh. In reviewing my book, *Some Concepts of Indian Culture*, a generous critic said that the Concepts of Indian Culture are 'popular' but that I give them an 'intellectual scaffolding and structure'. But as this is a process which leaves me dissatisfied, I re-think what I thought and re-write what I write. This is both a

‘Recollection’ and a ‘Discovery’. And so in two of my Lectures here I return to two topics from my book; for, like the Lover who sees in the same face of his Beloved something always new I see in these same topics and concepts something new like the Dawn that is ever new and is ever Welcome.

It is not, of course, the case that what is new is what is original. What is new seems to unsettle settled habits of thought. I did see therefore a ‘bewilderment’ in the eyes of the students who were listening to me as if to indicate that they were not sure in their mind whether they were passing from darkness to light or from light into darkness, especially on my distinction between seeing and seeing. Whereas, the Chairman, Professor S. S. Raghavachar, who presided over all the three lectures and summed up and interpreted me, was, in one Lecture so absorbed with himself that he forgot to offer me the customary vote of thanks! He was right; for, after all, I was talking towards the end of that Lecture on the distinction between Silence and Silence. He thanked me in silence!

These Essays are short; although they are short they entailed labour in writing and re-writing them to make them more short; and, in this labour I discovered a self-forgetful delight, and so it is appropriate that I should have as the sub-title *Delight of Being*.

But I have experienced Delight of Being on other occasions as well and not merely in writing: I have found it in conversations with a gracious and high-minded person, a Prince, but a scholar among Princes: on History, Philosophy, Music, Wild-Life, World-Travel, and on Ideas and Men; and I have learnt from the ease and sobriety with which his transparent mind discourses on

them: It is appropriate that I should dedicate my reflections to him.

But I do not expect others to agree with me. Nor is the intent of my Inquiry to seek truth by refutation. G. E. Moore wrote his famous Essay on 'Refutation of Idealism'. But Idealism is neither proved nor refuted.

Man's consciousness of God, said Hegel, is God's consciousness of Himself in Man. It may be the same in the interpretation of a Tradition. The interpretation of a Tradition may be a self-interpretation of itself through him that lives in it, and lives it. The differing and different interpretations of a Constitution by Judges may never fully interpret a Constitution; for, a Constitution is 'greater than', to use a phrase from the *Bhūma-vidya* of the Upanisad, its interpretations. It may be likewise with a Tradition. Therefore the question whether an interpretation is in conformity with the Tradition is under the illusion that the Tradition is 'closed', whereas, a tradition that endures, endures because of its *unknown* 'openness' which becomes more 'open' before the 'openness' of Inquiry. Indeed, there is involved, here, the same sort of fallacy that Immanuel Kant points out in the notion of a 'Completed Infinite'. But is not Inquiry the Tradition? If so, the main proposition of these reflections is: Now, therefore, the Inquiry.

I record my thanks to Dr Prabhu Shankara, Director of the *Prasaranga* for arranging the Lectures and for his uncommon courtesy, and to Professor S. S. Raghavachar, a former colleague who is still a friend, for presiding over the Lectures and for his excellent summing up at the end, and for the Introductory Foreword.

Bangalore

April 10, 1970

N. A. NIKAM

INTRODUCTORY FOREWORD

Prof. N. A. Nikam has imposed on me the honour of writing an Introductory Foreword to the three special lectures, being published by the Prasaraṅga, which he delivered in the Department of Philosophy, Manasa Gangotri.

The first lecture deals with the nature of philosophical inquiry. In it we are introduced to some fundamental distinctions, all too subtle for the ordinary student of Philosophy but called for by the sophistication of recent analytical philosophy. The analysis discloses some vital profundities of Upanishadic thought. This is a masterly exercise in analytical vedānta, which has about it a deceptive simplicity.

The second lecture concerns itself with the question 'Is Truth the Good?' Prof. Nikam examines the import of the identification of Satya and Dharma, announced in a great passage, in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and brings out its inspiring role in the living structure of Hindu Culture.

The third lecture also relates to Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Its main theme is 'Delight of Being'. It analyses the antinomial nature of being, and expounds the dialectic involved in the passage from Being to Delight of Being. There is no Being without Delight of Being.

The writing is lucid but terse and not unexact from the stand point of the reader. It calls for ceaseless

alertness on his part. But the reward is more than justifies the labour. To follow Prof. Nikam is an education in the analytical methods of philosophy, as we are awakened into a fresh appreciation of the undiminished wisdom of the Upanishads. One is glad that Vedanta emerges with added splendours after passing through all the arduous analyses and dialectics. Prof. Nikam has the paradoxical knack of both provoking reflection and imparting illumination, as the advanced student of philosophy will discover in reading these lectures.

PROF. S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

TO
HIS HIGHNESS
SRI JAYACHAMA RAJA WADIYAR
BAHADUR, MAHARAJA OF MYSORE
IN LOYALTY, AFFECTION AND GRATITUDE


LECTURE I

PHILOSOPHY AS QUESTION AND ANSWER

I shall introduce this Lecture by distinguishing between three kinds of Ignorance:

1. Philosophy may be defined as ignorance that is aware of itself: I know that I do not know, and as the Upanisad says, *yasya amatam tasya matam*, 'He that says he knows not, he knows'. If there is in the Philosopher an ignorance that is aware of itself then it entails that there is an ignorance that is not aware of itself. Now in Indian Culture, ignorance that is *not* aware of itself is of two types: (a) mere ignorance, and, (b) 'learned' ignorance. In the language of the Upanisads, the merely ignorant are *mudāh* 'the stupid' or 'the foolish'. The 'stupid' are compared to the 'blind leading the blind' *andhenaiva niyamāna yathāndhah*. The merely ignorant or the 'stupid' have committed 'spiritual suicide' *ātma hanojanāh*: 'Devilish are those worlds called, with blind darkness covered o'er: unto them, on descending go, those who are slayers of the Self'. *Asurya nāma te loka, andhena tamasā vrāth, tamas te pretyābhigacchanti ye ke cātmahano janāh*. But the 'slayers of the Self' do not 'go' to devilish worlds; they are already there. The ignorant are involved in delusion and self-pity and sorrow; they grieve 'vainly and helplessly' *anisaya socati muhyamānah*. In Plato's language, mere ignorance is a 'lie in the Soul' which is a self-deception.

Which of the two is more dangerous, mere ignorance or 'learned' ignorance? This is the question. In the



Isa Upanisad, mere ignorance is named *a-vidya* and 'learned' ignorance is euphemistically called *vidya*, and the *Upanisad* says that if *a-vidya* is dangerous, because it does not know that it does not know, *vidya*, an euphemism for knowledge is more dangerous because it is under a self-delusion, and so it *thinks* it knows, whereas, it also does not know that it does not know. Now, neither ignorance nor 'learned' ignorance Inquires or makes the Inquiry. It seems that while there is hope for mere ignorance to become aware of itself, 'learned' ignorance, it seems, has no such hope because 'learned' ignorance conceals itself and appears as knowledge, *ajānanena āvratam jñānam tena muhyanti jantavah*. 'Learned' ignorance that passes for knowledge does not Inquire; it does not examine; instead, it opposes; it is given to refutation and controversy, not to investigation: *na anyad asti iti vādinah*: 'Nothing else (except what it says), is true or exists'; such is its dogmatic temper. 'Learned' ignorance is the dogma that says 'only this'. When Philosophy ceases to be *samvāda* or Conversation or Dialogue it declines into *vāda*. When philosophy declines from Dialogue it declines from Dialectic, from the Science of Discovery of Being and becomes 'Eristic' merely a play of logic, and words about words. If mere ignorance does not inquire or examine because it is too 'stupid', 'learned' ignorance does not also inquire or examine because it *thinks* it knows. If mere ignorance is involved in vain sorrow and grief, 'learned' ignorance is involved in self-delusion. In its self-delusion 'learned' ignorance seems to be pleased with itself as the following passage from the *Chāndogya Upanisad* illustrates: (VIII, 7.1-4; 8.1-4; 9.1-2).


2. *Praja-Pati's Instruction to Indra Concerning the Real self.*

'The Self which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose desire is the real, whose thought is the real, he should be sought, him one should desire to understand. He who has found out and who understands that self, he obtains all worlds and all desires. Thus spoke Prajā-Pati.

The gods and the demons both heard it and said, 'Well, let us seek that Self, the self by seeking whom one obtains all worlds and all desires'. Then Indra from among the gods went forth unto him and Virocana from among the demons. Then without communicating with each other, the two came into the presence of Prajā-Pati, fuel in hand.

For thirty-two years the two lived there the disciplined life of a student of sacred knowledge. Then Praja-pati asked them, 'Desiring what have you been living?' The two said, 'The Self which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose desire is the real, whose thought is the real. He should be sought, him one should desire to understand. He who has found out, he who Understands that Self he obtains all worlds and all desires'. These, people declare to be your word, Venerable Sir, desiring him we have been living.

Prajā-pati said to the two, 'The person that is seen in the eye, that is the Self', said he. 'That is the immortal, the fearless. That is Brahman. 'But, Venerable Sir, he who is perceived in water and in a mirror, who is he?' He replied, 'The same one, indeed, is perceived in all these'.



THE BODILY SELF

Look at your self in a pan of water and whatever you do not understand of the self, tell me. Then the two looked in a pan of water. Then Prajā-pati said to the two, 'What do you see?' Then the two said, 'We both see the self thus altogether, Venerable Sir, a picture even to the very hairs and nails'.

Then Prajā-pati said to the two, after you have well adorned your-selves, put on your best clothes, make yourselves tidy, look into the pan of water. Then the two adorned themselves well, put on their best clothes and made themselves tidy and looked into the pan of water. Then Prajā-pati said to the two, 'What do you see?'

The two said, 'Just as we are, Venerable Sir, well adorned, with our best clothes and tidy, thus we see both these, Venerable Sir, well adorned, with our best clothes and tidy'. 'That is the Self', said he. 'That is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman'. They both went away with a tranquil heart.

Then Prajā-pati looked at them and said, they go away without having perceived, without having known the Self. Whosoever will follow such a doctrine, be they gods or demons they shall perish. Then Virocana with a tranquil heart went to the demons and declared that doctrine. He who makes his own self happy here and he who serves his own self, he obtains both worlds, this world and the yonder.

Therefore even here they say of one who is not a giver, who has no faith, who does not offer sacrifices, that he is a demon, for this is the doctrine of the demons. They adorn the body of the deceased with what they have begged, with clothes and with ornaments, and think that thereby they will win the yonder world.

INDRA FEELS THE INADEQUACY OF THE PHYSICAL THEORY

But Indra, even before reaching the gods saw this danger. Even as this self (the bodily self) is well adorned when this body is well adorned, well dressed when the body is well dressed, tidy when the body is tidy, that self will also be blind when the body is blind, lame when the body is lame, crippled when the body is crippled. Its perishes immediately when the body perishes. I see no good in this.

He came back again with fuel in hand. To him Prajapati said, 'Desiring what, O'Maghvan, have you come back, since you along with Virocana went away with a tranquil heart?' Then he said, 'Even as this self (the bodily self) is well adorned when this body is well adorned, well dressed when the body is well dressed, tidy when the body is tidy, that self will also be blind when the body is blind, lame when the body is lame, crippled when the body is crippled. It perishes immediately when the body perishes. I see no good in this.'

Virocana illustrates 'learned' ignorance which *thinks* it knows and does not, therefore, Inquire, whereas, Indra represents Inquiry, and Inquiry that examines itself, and never ceases.

3. Philosophy as Inquiry is ignorance that is aware of itself, ignorance that *knows* that it does not know. Ignorance that is aware of itself, is aware of a Mystery, of a Supreme Mystery, *guh yatamam uttamam*, the Mystery of Being: Because it does not know *what* the Mystery is it Inquires. Inquiry is moved by a Faith, Faith in

Inquiry. Inquiry is a Faith that Inquires. If we ask, for instance, 'Is Metaphysics possible?' the answer is 'Yes': Metaphysics is possible *as* Inquiry; it has existed in human cultures as such. But Inquiry is not merely inquiry into 'this or that' but inquiry into the possibility of self-inquiry; therefore there is no examination without *self*-examination. And so the Philosopher is involved in Self-Inquiry: 'Know Thyself' *ātmanam viddhi*. But the Philosopher is not involved in the proposition 'Know Thyself' without being involved in examining what 'Knowing' is. For, does he 'Know' himself in the same sense in which he 'knows' a sense-datum? No; Because as the Upanisad says 'there the eye goes not, speech goes not, nor the mind'; therefore the philosopher does not 'know' himself unless he knows what it is to 'know' in saying 'Know Thyself'. The Philosopher is involved in a dialogue with himself. No one who is not involved in a dialogue with one's self can be involved in a dialogue with others; therefore he who is involved in a dialogue with himself retires into solitude. But solitude is the inner-silence of mind. And inner-silence is not failure of speech but a mode of communication which is communicated through silence. *Sāntoayam atma* 'the atman is silence (and is attained through silence). Here is a dialogue with Ramana Maharishi, the upanishadic seer of contemporary India:

'Question: Is solitude necessary for a Sannyasin?

Answer: Solitude is in the mind of man. One might be in the thick of the world and yet maintain perfect serenity of mind; such as person is always in solitude. Another may stay in the forest, but still be unable to control his mind. He cannot be said to be in solitude'. (p. 15 *Maharishi's Gospel*, Tiruvannamalai, 1949).

Is inner-silence which the philosopher seems to reach in a dialogue with himself a 'failure of speech'? Wittgenstein said at the end of his Logico-Philosophical treatise and inquiry, 'whereof one cannot speak, thereof one ought to be silent'. Now, what is it of which the philosopher speaks or can speak, and what is it of which cannot speak? The philosopher analyses propositions, and speaks and can *speak* of their 'Form'. The philosopher *speaks* and can speak about 'Form' but cannot speak about what is 'Formless'. The philosopher does *not* say that what is 'there' is only what can be spoken *about*. He means that there *is* something although it is what cannot be spoken *about*. He *affirms* its reality by that which is the opposite of speech, viz., *silence*, and silence is a mode of affirmation and communication, and not its failure. Silence is affirmation of the 'Formless' as speech is affirmation of what has 'Form'; therefore Carlyle referred to 'Formless Silence' in his Lecture on *The Hero as Divinity*; it seems that the 'Formless Silence' that the Hero as Divinity has, is also in the philosopher.

4. There is Inquiry because there is some one who Inquires. But for whom is there Inquiry? For him who says 'It is' or for him who says 'It is not'? How can there be Inquiry for him who says 'It is not'? For, a sceptic who is not sceptical towards his own scepticism is no sceptic; nor is a doubter who does not doubt his own doubt a good doubter. Inquiry is not for him who says 'I know well'; nor for him who says 'I know not at all'. He who Inquires *knows*; otherwise, how or why will he enquire?: *astiti bruvato nyatra katham tad upalabhyate*?: 'How can it be comprehended except by him who says 'It is'. Inquiry is into the nature of 'What is', not into the nature of 'What is *not*'. But when the Upanisad says *asato mā sadgamaya* 'Lead me from the unreal


to the real', the Upanisad does not mean that we pass from 'Non-Being' to 'Being'. It means: 'Let me Become that which it is in me to Be'? Inquiry is inquiry into Being, not into non-Being. In asking that question 'Who am I?' he who Inquires, Inquires and affirms that into which he Inquires: This is the paradox.

5. There is no Inquiry without a question. And so Philosophy as Inquiry arises as a question, and lives as a dialogue. But not all questions are philosophical questions, nor all questions give rise to dialogue. A dialogue does not arise from a question which seeks merely information or from a question which merely seeks a definition; nor does a dialogue arise because a question is answered but because a question is questioned. A Dialogue is to Philosophy what Experiment is to Science. Both are involved in the method of Discovery and the method of Verification, and both lead to a practical end. There is no dialogue if the Individual as the Individual is not involved: i.e., If he asks merely the speculative question 'What can I know?' and not 'What can I *become*?' Therefore there are questions and questions. There are questions that require to be questioned; there are questions which can be answered with a 'Yes' or 'No'; there are questions which cannot be thus answered. And there are questions which need not be answered because they should not be asked at all, and there are questions which are answered thus: 'Live with me a year, with austerity, chastity, and faith, and then, ask what questions you will'. Inquiry involves and is involved in a 'Way of life', and the authority to Inquiry comes from an authentic mode of life. Therefore he who inquires ought to get authority to question authority. Asking a question in Philosophy is not easy but difficult, and yet asking a question is not what is optional but what is obligatory,

and it seems that a question must be asked even though we do not or may not know what the answer is.

For instance, Aristotle defines Good as the object of desire. We do not understand this definition if we do not ask: Is not Ought involved in Good? If so, is not Good what *ought* to be desired? If Good is what ought to be desired, then ought we to desire what we desire? If so, we ought to distinguish between desires and desires, between desires that are desired and desires that ought to be desired or desires that are desirable. Good is not an object of desire because man is 'a desirer of desires' but because there are desires that are desirable, and there are desires that are not desirable. It follows that in the pursuit of the Good, and as a necessary and sufficient condition of the Good, man ought to abstain from desires that are not desirable, and *desire* only those that are desirable; and, because man *desires* desires that are desirable, it is the case that Good is the object of desire.

6. In the Nineteenth Book of the *Abhidharma-Kosa*, four classes of questions are mentioned: (a) Questions which can be answered directly, with a 'Yes' or 'No': e.g. Do all living beings die? Yes, they all die; (b) Questions which can be answered only with a reservation: Will beings be reborn?: the answer is Yes and No: those who have not yet overcome their passion will be reborn; those who have destroyed or conquered their passion will not be reborn; (c) Questions which need a counter-question: Is a man strong or weak?: in relation to whom is the counter-question; (d) Questions which cannot be answered: (because they should not have been asked as they do not lead to enlightenment): These are the fourteen famous questions which the Buddha refused to answer:



- 1— 4: Is the world constant?—or not—or both or
neither?
- 5— 8: Is the world limited in time?—or not—or
both—or neither?
- 9—12: Does the *Tathagata* exist after death—or
not—or both—or neither?
- 13—14: Are life and body identical or not?

7. There is no dialogue without a question or without a good question or a good questioner: 'May we, find, Naciketas, a questioner like thee' says the *Katha Upanisad*. In the Upanishadic tradition, no teacher imparts knowledge—knowledge of *Brahman*—to a pupil who is not ready to receive it; the test of his readiness or preparedness to receive it is his ability to ask the right questions. Because there are pupils who ask questions there are teachers; it is to teachers that pupils 'go' and teachers are there 'for the sake of' pupils. The function of a teacher and what he is for may be illustrated as follows: Supposing a man is 'some how' blind-folded, and is led away from home to a distant and strange place and is released there and his blind-fold is removed; he cannot return home even though he can now see because he does not know the way. He will not know the way unless he *asks* others who know the way, and there is at least someone who knows the way and can tell him about the way. And the man must *inquire* his way home. Here, there is the Inquiry, and the Inquirer, the Way, and some one who shows him the Way. All are important. We do not have to ask the question why the man was blind-folded? Likewise we do not have to ask the question why is there ignorance in man? All that we can say is it is there 'some how'. The relevant point is whether there is a way out of his ignorance. Although ignorance

is there 'some how' it does not follow that 'some how' he will get over it. If he could 'some how' get over it there would be no need for Inquiry and no need for a teacher. Inquiry therefore is not 'optional'; it is not what you may or may not make. Inquiry is Means, and Inquiry is the End: Inquiry is Means to the End which is also Inquiry: Inquiry is a Way to the Way. In exactly the same manner as there is some one who shows the way to the man who has lost his way and the man who has lost his way knows from him the way 'does one who has a teacher know' says the Upanisad. Therefore there is need of a Teacher. But who is a Teacher?

In this context, the *Katha* Upanisad says: *na narena āvarena prokta, eṣa suvijneyah*, '(If) taught by an inferior man, He (the Self) cannot be truly understood'. Does any one desire to understand the Self except Truly? Can an 'inferior man' teach?; Or, is a 'Teacher' an 'inferior man'? Is not a 'Teacher' utterly distinct from a 'Sophist'? If a 'Teacher' is one to whom pupils 'go' 'with fuel in hand' as the Upanisad says, do they 'go' to an 'inferior man'? As the Upanisad says they go to a man who 'will explain all' to them. It seems that before the 'Teacher' selects his pupils the pupils have selected their 'Teacher'. The pupils know that they do not know; but they know who is a teacher. A 'Teacher' is one who is *conscious* of his vocation. Is a man who is *conscious* of his vocation 'an inferior man'? In human culture no 'Teacher' is an 'inferior man' and in human culture no man is equal to a 'Teacher'.

8. In the Upanishadic tradition, it is the pupils who 'go' to a teacher and question the teacher. In the dialogues of Plato, on contrary, it is Socrates, the wise man who knows that he does not know, that questions his

‘friends’. And he questions them to expose the ignorance that in them passes for knowledge. The Socratic method of ‘cross-examination’ is Inquiry which teaches the art of unlearning what is learnt. By the art of ‘cross-examination’ not only does Socrates expose the ignorance that passes for knowledge but awakens, those whom he cross-examines, to a knowledge of which they are ignorant. The Socratic ‘awakening’ is a ‘Recollection’, a ‘Transcendental Recollection’ of the state when the soul ‘was in company with Ideas’. Therefore there is no dialogue which is merely the art of examining propositions without examining one’s self. And examining one’s self is *awakening* to a state when the soul *was*—in a *timeless* sense of ‘was’—in the ‘company of Ideas’. And the ‘was’ is a *Recollection*: The ‘*Recollection*’ is a dialectical and not a temporal regress into what ‘was’. The Socratic doctrine of Transcendental Recollection takes us back to a ‘before’ that ‘was’ in a timeless sense. Now inquiry into what ‘Was’ is a dialectical device of inquiry into a what ‘is’: For, what ‘was’ in a timeless sense is ‘what never was not’; therefore it is inquiry into what ‘is’.

9. Socrates said ‘No proposition can *be* un-examined’; but Socrates did not examine only propositions, He discovered that no proposition can be examined without examining one’s self. There is no inquiry which is not self-inquiry; there is no *vichara* without *ātma-vichara*; and in examining one’s self in the Socratic sense one *knows* that one does not know.

Now, examining propositions and examining one’s self may be compared to two kinds of ‘seeing’, seeing ‘without’ and seeing ‘within’. And Plato said that seeing ‘within’ is not like giving eyes but giving the eyes we have a direction they have not: This, he said, is ‘Conversion’. It is ‘Conversion’ that is the true nature of

Religion, and the goal of Civilization is not merely to look 'without', which is present in abundance in Science, but to look 'within' with eyes turned within *āvratta caksur*, as the Upanisad says.

Now, in distinguishing between seeing 'without' and seeing 'within' we are distinguishing between two kinds of 'seeing'. And just as there is a distinction between ignorance and ignorance, between question and question, so there is a distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing'. And so, there are two questions: (a) Why is there seeing 'within'?; and, (b) Is seeing 'within' merely another kind of 'seeing'? Is it 'seeing' at all? The Upanisad answers the first question and says that there is seeing 'within' because there is 'Life Eternal': 'Some wise man, seeking life eternal, with eyes turned within, *saw* the Self': *Kascid dhirah pratyag ātmanam aiksad, āvratta caksur, amrtatvam icchan.*

At this stage, it is relevant to inquire into a difficult use of 'see' in the Upanisads. The Upanisad says, 'Some wise man *saw* the self with eyes turned within'. If the Self is that 'where the eye goes not etc.,' as the Upanisad also says, how does the wise man 'see' the Self even by 'seeing within'? For, 'seeing within' is logically a 'determinate' under the same 'Determinable' viz., 'See'. When Svetaketu was asked by his father Uddlaka to break open a seed of the *Nygrodha* tree and when Svetaketu did it his father asked him, 'What do you *see*?' Svetaketu replied: '(I see) *Nothing* at all, Sir'. Now, how could Svetaketu *see* 'Nothing'? But it was an appropriate answer to his father's question, 'What do you *see*?' Svetaketu did not say that there *is* 'Nothing'. Even so, how could he *see* 'Nothing'? How could it *be* 'Nothing' if as his father says '*That* thou art'? 'Nothing' cannot *be*: 'That' which Svetaketu *is*, is not 'seen' or


is not 'the seen'. It does *not* belong to the Observable Kind. If (Svetaketu's) Being is what *is* but is not 'the seen', then, how is Being 'seen' by the Wise man even by 'seeing within': for the 'seer' is not the 'seen'? Is 'seeing within' a form of 'seeing' at all? It is not: for 'Seeing within' is '*Being* within': You have to *be* inward to 'see' within. There is a distinction between: (a) Something which belongs to the Observable Kind but is not, *infact* 'seen', (e.g. electrons); and (b) Something that is not 'seen' because it does *not, infact*, belong to the Observable Kind.

Now 'inwardness of Being' is: (a) a process a *discipline*, a *Yoga* of *merging that into that from which emerges*: Speech into Mind, and so on; and, (b) its *direction* is towards the Source, the source of Being which is tranquillity of Being, *sānta-ātma*. Tranquillity and Peace is the nature of our Being. And the wise man affirms by his silence that his Being is tranquillity and peace. Inquiry and *Yoga* converge towards the same Goal: Tranquillity and peace which is 'Life Eternal': And 'Life Eternal' is *here and now*: It is not what 'was' when the Soul was in company with Ideas. There is a Silence which overtakes us and contradicts Being which is *mrtyu*, death, and there is a Silence, which is 'Life Eternal' which is the death of death; if death is the negation of life, the negation of the negation is not life that is subject to death but Life Eternal to which, as the Upanisad says 'Death has the same pleasant taste as sauce', *mrtyur yasya upasecanam*.

10. But we must return to question and answer. Philosophy arises as a question and lives as a dialogue. As not all questions give rise to dialogue there is the question, 'what kind of questions give rise to dialogue?'; therefore there is the question, 'what is a *philosophical* question?'

Now, the question '*what* is a philosophical question' *distinguishes* a philosophical question from other questions; therefore a *philosophical* question may be defined as that sort of question which entails a fundamental distinction or the answer to a question that is a philosophical question entails a fundamental distinction. This means that a philosophical question is not answered directly but is answered by pointing to a fundamental distinction that it implies. A significant part of the Dialogue that is Question and Answer therefore is the art and science of making implications of questions aware to him who asks the question. And, although the art of making distinctions is based on 'skill' in Logic, yet, the art of Question and Answer is not an exercise in Logic; for, philosophy is not merely logic: Logic gives us the truth but not 'the whole truth'.

In the dialogues of the Upanisads, there are three types of fundamental questions and each of the three questions entails a fundamental distinction: (a) There is the question with which the *Kena* Upanisad begins: 'By whom willed and directed does the mind light on its objects? By whom commanded does life the first move? At whose will do (people) utter this speech? And what god is it that prompts the eye and the ear?' (b) There is the question in the *Katha*: 'There is this doubt in regard to a man who has departed, some (holding) that he is, and some that is not. I would be instructed by Thee in this Knowledge'. (c) Then, there is the question asked in the *Mundaka*: 'By knowing what, Sir, does all this become known? The question asked in the *Kena* implies understanding the distinction between two demonstrative symbols: (a) 'That which is seen *by* the eye', and, (b) 'That *by* which the eye sees'; it rests on distinguishing between a reality that belongs to the



‘Observable Kind and a reality that is not of the Observable Kind. The question asked in the *Katha* about immortality rests on understanding the distinction between *sreyas* and *preyas*, the Good and Pleasure. The Question that the *Mundaka* asks rests upon the distinction between *parā-vidya* ‘higher knowledge’ and *a-parā-vidya* ‘Lower knowledge’. Now all the three questions cut across ‘theories’ and ‘systems’, and give the Upanisads a comprehensiveness that liberates them from the limitations of philosophical systems or established historical religions.

Now, let us enter into a dialogue on one of the three questions, the question asked in the *Mundaka*, ‘By knowing *What* does all this become known?’, and ask some significant questions. *First question:* Since a ‘What’ implies a ‘That’, is the question significant if there is no reality denoted by the demonstrative symbol ‘That’? *Second question:* What is the relevance of the distinction between *parā-vidya*, ‘higher knowledge’ and *a-parā-vidya*, ‘lower knowledge’ if ‘That by knowing which everything else is known’ has not, in its own nature, both the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’? *Third question:* What is it that is both ‘Higher’ and ‘Lower’ except that which is Infinite: such that our knowledge of It is dialectical movement in which the ‘higher’ we go the ‘higher’ we can go? Therefore it makes no difference whether we say: we go from the ‘lower’ to the ‘higher’ or from the ‘higher’ to the ‘higher’? Therefore the Infinite can never be spoken of as ‘the highest’ but as ‘higher than the highest’ *aksarāt paratah parah*: *Fourth question:* Since the object of *parā-vidya* is *aksara*, the Imperishable as the Upanisad says, is the Imperishable of the *pāra-vidya* the same as Matter of natural science since Matter is also ‘indestructible’? If not, does it not follow that the Imperishable

of the *parā-vidya* is not anything other than *That* which is *aware* that it is imperishable, *na jāyate mriyate vā kada-cin?* *Fifth question:* Is it sufficient merely to say that, 'That which is *aware* that it is imperishable' is 'there'? No; instead, the Upanisad makes the affirmation: 'That Thou Art'. If so, it seems that, *that about which* the question was asked, 'By knowing *what* does all this become known?' is *that which asks the question:* Therefore it seems that the answer to the question 'By knowing what does all this become known?' is another question 'Who is it that asks the question?'

The Dialogue that is Question and Answer begins at the point where it seems to end, and the five questions represent in substance the dialectic of the *Vedānta*. The *Vedānta* literally means 'the end of the *Veda* but as the *Veda* has no 'end', the *Vedānta* is the end of that which has no end which is Inquiry. 'In the quest of the Imperishable alone is that which he chooses his': this is the openness of the scientific inquiry of the *Vedānta*. The Absolute of the *Vedānta* is affirmed only by an absolute denial, *neti, neti*, 'not this', 'not this': But as there is no absolute denial which is only a denial of the other and is not also a self-denial, the *Vedānta* exists by not opposing its own extinction: For, that which survives when the *Vedānta* is extinct is *Vedānta*.



LECTURE II

IS THE TRUTH GOOD ?

Is the Good, Truth ?

Let us try to get an insight into the rational equivalence there is in the Philosophy of Indian Culture between *Satya* and *Dharma* by the illustration of a problem involved in Philosophical Logic.

1. In Logic a definition is of a symbol; definition involves two terms, the term that is defined and the term that defines it. And the rule is that, the term that defines must have the same logical meaning as the term defined. Now, if the term that defines has the same meaning as the term defined, why should the term that is defined be defined? If, on the contrary, the term that defines has a meaning other than the term defined how could it define the term it defines? If, on the other hand, one term is defined in terms of another and this is defined in terms of a third, then, definition is impossible as definition is involved in an endless regress. If a symbol X is defined in terms of another symbol Y and if Y has the same meaning as X (i.e. a transitive symmetrical relation) then, it means that one of the symbols must be *understood* and not further defined. Definition is possible if and only if there is some term that is *understood*, and not further defined. Definition implies: (a) There is some term which is *understood*; (b) and as what is *understood* need not be further defined, definition is logically impossible if there are no *indefinables*. And the 'indefinables' of Logic are symbols which are *understood*; the possibility

of knowledge is dependent upon symbols which are *understood* and are not further defined. In other words, definition implies the notion of the 'indefinable' but the 'indefinable' is the notion of what is *known* in an indefinable and significant sense. Therefore there are three notions involved in definition: (a) In definition, there is some term which is *understood* and is not defined; (b) what is *understood* is *known* in an indefinable sense; (c) and what is known in one context, is *recognised* in another context. Now, the two 'postulates' of Indian Culture, as we shall see, illustrate the problem involved in definition: viz. that the term that defines must have the same meaning as the term defined, and one of them at least must be *understood* and *known* in an indefinable sense.

2. There are propositions in the Upanishads that are consistent with the problem that definition involves in knowledge. For instance, the *Brihad-Aranyaka* Upanishad defines the symbol *satya* in terms of the symbol *dharma*, and defines *dharma* in terms of *satya*: (i.e. there is a relation of co-implication between them). This entails that one at least of the two symbols is *understood*: i.e. *known* in an indefinable sense. This means that knowledge is not a process from the known to the unknown but from the *known* in one sense to the *known* in another sense. Says the Upanishad: *Yo Vai dharmah, satyam vaitat; tasmāt satyam vadantam āhuh dharmam vadantam iti; dharmam vā vadantama, satyam vadatiti; etad hy evaitad ubhayam bhavati*: 'Verily, that which is justice is truth; therefore, they say of a man who speaks the truth, he speaks the just, or of a man who speaks the just that he speaks the truth. *Verily, both these are the same*'. (1.4.14). Although the upanishad says, 'Verily, both these are the same' it distinguishes between *satya*

and *dharma*, and says that to know one is to have known the other: i.e. one of them at least is known in an indefinable sense. These symbols *satya* and *dharma* are not the indefinables of Logic but the indefinables of a culture, the indefinables of Indian Culture. Comparative Philosophy ought to become a study as an Inquiry into the nature of 'Indefinables' of Human Cultures.

3. Let us now enter upon an analytical study of these two symbols, *satya* and *dharma*. The word *satya* is derived from the root *sat*, and *sat* means 'what is': The 'is' has no temporal sense. Therefore 'is' means 'what never was not' and, 'what will never cease to be'. As such, it means the same as *aksara*, another symbol in the upanisads, which is what is 'indestructible' but not 'indestructible' in a physical sense only. The notion of 'indestructible' does not mean what ceases to be in time, but the notion of what is not destroyed by evil, for, evil is the principle of destruction. If so, that which *is* in a non-temporal sense, is what is not destroyed by evil, and so, truth or *sat* or *satya* means Good, for, Good is not destroyed by evil, and so, truth does not mean, in Indian Culture, only propositional truth.

In the Upanisads, there is another meaning of 'is': It is the meaning 'is the same as'. This is another meaning of truth: In this sense, *satya* 'is the same as' *dharma*, and *dharma* 'is the same as' *satya*. The notion of 'is' 'as' 'is the same as' is the ground of Monism in the upanisads: 'what is, is': i.e. What is *Brahman* 'is the same as' *Ātman*, and what is *Ātman* 'is the same as' *Brahman*. If is, of course, possible that if X has a relation to Y, Y may not have the same relation to X. This is the notion of a transitive, a-symmetrical relation but if Y has the same relation to X that X has to Y, then, it is transitive symmetrical relation; it may also be called a 'co-implicant'

relation. And so, the notion of 'is' as 'is the same as' is a co-implicant relation. But it seems that the notion of truth as 'is the same as' is both a relation, and a constituent in the relation. If *satya* 'is the same as' *dharmā*, then, *satya* is a relation as well as a constituent in the relation. The contemporary German Philosopher, Martin Heidegger says that, 'Truth, Being and Existence are a single event'; the upanishad says more: It says, 'Truth, Being, Existence *and Good* are a single event'. If so, the philosophy of Indian Culture says: Truth is the Good, and the Good is the Truth; 'that is all ye know, and that is all ye need to know'.

4. But truth is not only 'what is' but what it *does*: 'The upanishad says, *satyam eva jayate*, 'Truth alone prevails'. This statement is not a prediction but a statement of Fact, a statement of 'what is the case'. This is a statement more significant than the statement that Truth and Being are identical: That 'Truth *alone* prevails' implies that *nothing else* prevails; and whatever prevails is truth.

But what is it to 'prevail'? Does 'prevail' imply the notion of a 'struggle'? We must discover the answer to this question in what the Philosophy of Indian Culture gives. It is not relevant to go outside it. What is the answer that the Philosophy of Indian Culture gives? The answer that it gives is that, nothing 'prevails' in anything that is involved in a 'struggle'. For instance, in the *Sāṃkhya* theory of *prakṛiti* or Matter-in Motion the constituents *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are involved in a 'struggle' in which none of the 'constituents' *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* 'prevails'. It is a 'struggle' between 'opposites', and in the struggle of the opposites, there is 'alternation' but no prevailing of one over the other.

It seems therefore that the notion truth as what 'prevails' is the notion of what is not involved in or what is above and beyond 'struggle', the struggle of opposites. In Indian Culture therefore what is *nirdvandhva* alone is *nitya satva*: What is 'truth eternal' is what is beyond or what has transcended 'duality'.

In this context, it is relevant to distinguish between *vedanta* and *vedanta*. The *Īsa* Upanisad distinguishes between two 'opposites' *a-vidya* and *vidya*, and warns us against both: *a-vidya* 'ignorance' and *vidya* 'learned ignorance' are the opposites of a partial philosophy; they represent truth but not 'the whole truth'. Now, that which warns us against both and says that if one is dangerous the other is more dangerous is not itself one of the two that it warns against. It seems therefore valid to say that the Vedanta as *perennial truth* (and not as a 'school') is not one of the opposites opposing others and opposed by others. The Vedanta as Truth and the Truth that is Vedanta as *philosophia perennis* is Truth that 'prevails' by not opposing its own extinction: For, that which survives when Truth is extinct is Truth. Like the *Tao*, *satya* 'accomplishes' but does not 'contend': 'The *Tao* never does, yet through it everything is done'. *Satya* is 'what is' and not 'what *does*', and it 'prevails' because it is what it is, and so it is that the commandments of Indian Culture are invariably of the form 'Be'. The way in which Truth 'prevails' may be illustrated by an analogy from the Upanisad. The analogy is in the Third *Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛihad-Āraṇyaka* upan-
isad. The passage refers to the chant of *Udgītha*: 'Then they said to the vital breath in the mouth: 'Chant (the Udgīta) for us'. So be it, said this breath and chanted for them (viz. the gods). They (the demons) knew, 'verily, by this chant, they will overcome us'. They rushed upon him

and desired to pierce him with evil. But as a clod of earth would be scattered by striking a rock, even so they were scattered in all directions and perished'. Truth 'prevails' like the rock that prevails against a clod of earth which is scattered to pieces when thrown against it. And so the man who speaks the Truth is like a rock; he 'prevails' without a struggle to prevail.

DHARMA

5. Let us now analyse the other notion in the equation *dharma*. *Sat* means 'what is', and 'what is' means what is *actual*: i.e. what is in its self-revelation or 'disclosedness' and not merely what is in its potency. Therefore Being is Actuality, and Actuality is what is by its *power* of self-manifestation. Now, *Sat* Being or *satya* Truth has a *power* by which it 'prevails'. The *power* by which Truth prevails is *dharma*; therefore there is victory wherever there is Truth or wherever is *dharma*: *satyam eva jayate, yato dharma tato jayah*. Indian Culture is an Inquiry into that Power by which what is, is.

But *dharma* is not merely *power* but a *power* which restrains power: *Dharma* is the power by which the weak man binds a strong man; *atho abaliyān baliyāmasam, āsamsate dharmena*. (4.14. Br. Up.) *Dharma* is *dama*, a principle which restrains or controls: *damena sadrasam dharmam nānyam lokesu*: 'There is not in the entire Universe another *dharma* equal to self-control'. Freedom means the freedom of self-restraint. *Dharma* is a power which restrains the power that makes things 'fly away from the centre'; therefore *dharma* means the power which holds things together: *Dharma* is what 'upholds' or 'supports'. *Dharma* is what is self-existent.


As self-existent, *dharma* is *Rta* ORDER, and ORDER is not what is created but what Creation pre-supposes; the gods are referred to as 'born of ORDER' *rtajata*. *Rta* is 'pre-established' like Leibniz's doctrine of 'Pre-established Harmony'. Order is the notion of a Universe in which the same order is present in the macrocosm as

well as in the microcosm. In another context the Upanisad says: 'what is here, that is there; (and) what is there, that, too, is here'; *yad eveha tad amutra; yad amutra tad anvaha* (*Katha*. II. 1.10). Order is what is 'here'; Order is what is 'there'; what is 'there' is 'here', what is 'here' is 'there'.

6. Order is manifest in the Universe as Law: As the Upanisad says, it is because of the 'fear' of the Law that fire burns, the sun shines, the wind blows, and death overtakes all things. In Man, however, or only in Man it is that Law becomes *conscious* of itself. Law, as conscious of itself is autonomy of will, which as Kant says, exists in Man as Ought. And so, Man says 'I ought to have done what, in fact, I have not done, and I ought not to have done what, in fact, I have done'. Although it seems that man's consciousness of ought carries with it a sense of confession and repentance, yet consciousness of ought is not merely a repentance over a past. *Dharma* is not repentance only nor mere grief over a past. Forgetting the past man must 'awake' and 'arise' and act for the future, and do what he ought to do as man *can* do what he ought to do as Kant said. And so, the Sanskrit term *Bhavya* means both what is future and yet to be and what is good. It means both what is future and what is good because the good is the goal of action; therefore, as Gita says 'To action alone thou last a Right'. This Right is the most Fundamental Right of Man. And so *dharma* is both consciousness of an Ought or Duty and a consciousness of Right or Rights. Although in modern times the ethical nature of Man expresses itself in terms of Rights, yet in human culture man's ethical nature has expressed itself in Commandments or duties as *prior* to Rights. And there are three commandments in the Upanisad: 'Be self controlled', *damyata*; 'Give', *datta*,

and 'Be compassionate', *dayādhvam*. The commandments of Indian Culture say 'Be' and not merely 'Do' or 'Act'. But a Philosopher like Professor W. T. Stace says in the *Journal, Philosophy, East and West* (Vol. II, No. 1, April, 1952) that there is not one word in the *Gita* of the Kantian conception of the Categorical Imperative and respect for the Moral Law. Now, the Kantian categorical Imperative says 'So *act* as to will thy Law Universal', whereas, the Categorical Imperative of Indian Culture is, 'So *Be* that the Universal Law acts through you' *nimitta mātram bhava*. But to choose the Universal Law is the same as the Universal Law choosing you.

7. Plato in the *Republic*, and Aristotle more fully in the *Nicomachean Ethics* stated the substance of the Greek moral consciousness in the four Cardinal Virtues, Wisdom, Temperance, Courage and Justice; these are the four-fold virtues of Man according to the Greeks. In Indian Culture, there is a five-fold conception of moral virtue: *satya*, *ahimsa*, *brahmacarya*, *āsteya* and *aparigraha*. Just as the *prakriti* of the *Sāmkhya* has three 'Constituents' so has *Dharma* its 'Constituents' in Indian Culture. Moral virtue is a habit of will and disposition; and so, when the desire to tell untruth vanishes and truth in thought, word, and deed becomes habitual, then there follows serenity of mind and man is released from fear; when the disposition or inclination to harm others in thought, word and deed vanishes then enmity ceases; when there is continence and the mind is free from indulgence in sensuous objects, then one retains his psycho-physical energy for intellectual, artistic, and spiritual achievement; when there is abstinence from 'stealing' (not taking what does not belong to one's self which the poor and the rich do), then wealth is safe in one's presence and is looked upon as belonging



to all, and the rich become the 'trustees' of the poor, and the state is not divided from within into warring camps of the rich and the poor; and when the desire to possess ceases or decreases, then one becomes aware of the true conditions of life, and discovers that there is no conflict between desire and the laws of existence. It is significant that the five 'constituents' of *dharma* begin with *satya* and end with *aparigraha* or non-possession; for, in the philosophy of Indian Culture there is no attainment of truth without non-possession. But 'non-possession' is not merely non-possession of wealth or property but non-possession of the 'possessor', a renunciation of the ego. It would seem that the conceptions of *āsteya* and *aparigraha*, are the First Principles of a Philosophy of Democratic Socialism or *Sarvodaya* which contemplates a Social Order which the individual creates by the principle of 'sharing' what he has, as a necessary step to a re-distribution of wealth.

8. In Vol. I of his *History of the Dharma Shastra*, Dr P. V. Kane says that in the evolution of the concept *dharma* came to mean, (a) the rights and duties of man as man, and (b) his duties and privileges as member of the *Aryan* Community. This means that *Dharma* is a 'diversity', 'a diversity of stage in life' *āśrama dharma*, and 'diversity of function' *varna-dharma*. Now, 'diversity of function' is based on 'merit and work' *guna* and *karma*; it *arises* in the State or in a Community; it arises when all the citizens in the State or members of a Community have 'equality of opportunity'. In the *Republic* of Plato, Plato distinguished between two sorts of diversities, 'diversity of nature' as he called it, which is based on birth, race, religion etc., and 'diversity of function' which is based on 'merit and work', and Plato said that the first must be destroyed in the interest of the State,

while, the second ought to be created in the interest of the State; therefore *dharma* as 'diversity of function' is Justice which 'arises' and 'is' when each citizen as Plato said 'minds his own business'. Now, 'diversity of function' is not a 'heirarchy' in which one function is lower or higher than another but is a conception of Justice where each one does 'his business', and each one's business is as important as the other. Gandhi said that the *Bhangi*, 'sweeper' is as important as the *Viceroy*.

9. Now, between 'a diversity of stage in life' *āśrama dharma* and 'diversity of function' *varna dharma* there is a distinction between the *Vedānta* as the 'Religion of Man', and Hinduism as the religion of a Community, the religion of the *Aryan* Community. For, the *Vedānta* on which Hinduism is based is essentially concerned with the Individual as Individual, and therefore in spite of *varna dharma* of traditional Hinduism, *Vedantic Hinduism* recognises, as it should, the right of Man as Man, irrespective of caste, creed, race, religion, colour or sex, to enter the last stage of life in *āśrama dharma*, the stage of the *sannyasin*. The *sannyasin* is the ideal of a 'free man' who has neither rights nor duties, and he alone rises above all social distinctions. He belongs to an Order, the 'Order of Nobodies' as Ananda Coomara Swamy calls it. It is he who has no rights or duties that is of the greatest relevance to a social order. And it is he who has attained that ideal of equality in which all are alike that is a symbol of 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity'. But the life of renunciation which the *sannyasin* symbolises is not merely a *stage* in life but an ideal that pervades and informs all stages of life, and so, the last word of the *Vedānta* is that, it is not necessary to become a *sannyasin* to live the ideal of a life that the *sannyasin* represents, and the virtues of *satya*, *ahimsa*, *brahmacarya*, *asteya* and

aparigraha that he practices in his disciplined life is the dharma, a *Right* and a *Duty*, which is possible for all, and is a possible foundation for a universal, basic, and natural ethic of Man and the ethic of a Social Order transcending ideological differences.

10. But more reflections become relevant at this stage, and so, we have to compare the notion of 'diversity of function' in a *Secular* State, and in a Community, for instance, the *Aryan* Community. To a treatise like the *Republic* of Plato and a treatise like the *Manu Dharma Shastra*, what is common to both is a conception of Justice or *dharma* as a 'diversity of function'. In all 'well-ordered states', every individual, said Plato, has an occupation to which he must attend, and so, Justice is 'doing one's own business', a potter to be a good potter. If, on the other hand, a potter ceases to be a potter and tries his hand at politics and becomes a bad politician, then, the State has lost a good potter and the art of making good pots. If this prevails, then, the potter will cease to be a potter, and husbandman will no longer be a husbandman 'and nobody will have a distinct character'. Now, although the notion of 'a well-ordered State' entails the notion of a 'diversity of function' and all are necessary for the ordered life of the State, yet there is a particular function in the *Republic* of Plato which makes it a function distinct from other functions. What is this function? This function is being the *guardian* of the State, and so, Socrates asks, 'And is there any *more important* work than to be a good soldier?' (italics mine: Book II. 374. Jowett). And to point out the 'importance' of being a guardian or a good soldier, Socrates asks: 'Is War an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan?' (Bk. II. 374). This means that in a 'well-ordered State', there is some

function which is 'more important' than other functions and is distinct from other functions. The function of being a 'good soldier' is 'more important' because the external security of the State and its internal order is 'more important'. And the art of being a good soldier does not come by 'the mere handling of tools', said Socrates: 'We shall have to select natures which are suited to their task of guarding the city'.

Now, while a State is secular, a Community is not or need not be: The *Aryan* Community, for instance, is not a secular Community. Is there a function, then, in a Community—in the *Aryan* Community—which, like a function in the secular *Republic* of Plato, is 'more important' and therefore distinct from other functions? It seems there *is* such a function. If so, how is it discovered? It is discovered by examining what a 'Community' is: A Community is organised around a body of 'Sacred Knowledge', and so, it follows that, in a Community, for instance, the *Aryan* Community—the function of being a student of Sacred Knowledge' is a *function* (and not a 'caste') that is 'more important' than other functions although in a 'diversity of function' all are necessary and all are equal. What is true of the *Aryan* Community is true of other Communities in Human Culture. In a State, the Individual seeks his security; in a Community, he seeks his salvation through 'Sacred Knowledge' around which the Community of which he is a member is organised. And if it is important 'to select proper natures which are suited to the task of guarding the city', is it less important to select 'proper natures' to be a 'student of Sacred Knowledge'? Now, the five 'constituents' of *dharma*, viz. *satya*, *ahimsa*, *brahmacarya*, *āsteya* and *aparigraha* and the life of discipline that they demand, define in the Indian Cultural tradition,



‘the proper natures’ suited to the ‘more important’ function of being ‘a student of Sacred Knowledge’. Now, it is significant that both in the secular State, and in a Community organised around a body of ‘Sacred Knowledge’, not merely labour but a *life of discipline* is a ‘more important’ function, the disciplined life of the soldier or the guardian in the State, and the disciplined life a ‘student of Sacred Knowledge in a Community. It is from the disciplined life of a soldier and the quality of his courage, which is freedom from the fear of death, that the State and all other functions in a ‘well-ordered State’ take their character and quality; and it is from the disciplined life of a ‘student of Sacred Knowledge’, his bodily purity and purity of thought, in word, and deed that a Community and all other functions of a Community take their ethical quality and character.

But in Human Culture, a student of ‘Sacred Knowledge’ is not merely a member of a Community. On the contrary, he belongs to a *tradition*, and the tradition has, in Indian Culture, both a history and a myth. Its history is the unbroken line of succession of teachers and pupils, each a link in a chain, the last of those who have gone before him and the first of those who come after him. It is this succession of teachers and pupils that is involved in the idea of history in the Indian Cultural tradition, and not merely the succession of Kings or Statesmen or Warriors as in Thucydides or Plutarch. And the significant point is that in Human Culture, the tradition of ‘Sacred Knowledge’ has an origin but no *human* origin. And so, says the *Mundaka Upanisad*: ‘Brahma arose as the first among the gods, the maker of the Universe, the protector of the World. He taught knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledges, to Atharvan, his eldest son. That knowledge of Brahman, which

Brahma taught to *Atharvan*, *Atharvan*, in olden times, told Angiras. He (in his turn) taught it to *Satyavaha*, son of Bharadvaja, and the son of Bharadvaja to Angiras . . .'; i.e. it is a tradition which has no 'end', and since the tradition is teaching the *same teaching* to a succession of teachers, it is a history which has no history. But the point is that which has no 'end' is or seems to have a 'beginning'. Why? Because, if ignorance is *anādi* or has no beginning, then, that which has no end, viz. *Brahma-vidya* has to have a beginning, and he that teaches it must 'arise'. His arising is a necessity: He arises because he *is*: His being is not what arises and perishes: His arising signifies the emerging power of Being. And what he teaches is: Truth is the Good, and the Good is Truth: The 'is' means not only 'is the same as' but what *is*, i.e. what is everlasting.

LECTURE III

BEING AND DELIGHT OF BEING

In this Essay, I shall expound an aspect of the Vedanta by selecting for comment a significant but short passage from the *Bṛihad-Āranyaka Upanisad*. The Vedanta is essentially experience; in fact it is both Reason and Experience. As Reason and Experience, the Vedanta is involved in a certain 'dialectic' which distinguishes itself from the opposites it encounters. Plato defined Dialectic as the Science of Being and said that Dialectic alone is 'progress' in Knowledge. Dialectic is a 'progress' in Knowledge in Plato in the same sense in which *Yoga* is a 'progress' in self-realisation in Indian Culture; and like progress in *Yoga*, there are stages in the 'progress' of Dialectic. The 'progress' is a movement and the movement that the Dialectic of Being involves is a 'progress' from Being to Delight of Being.

1. Philosophy *arises* as a Question, and *lives* as a Dialogue; dialogue is 'instruction': It is that instruction 'By which the unhearable or the unheard becomes heard, the unperceivable becomes perceived, the unknowable becomes known' (*Chāndogya Upanisad*, VI. 1.3). The intent of the dialogue is to bring to the awareness of the pupil what he was not aware of: Ignorance which is not aware of itself and therefore does not inquire, inquires when it becomes aware of itself. Ignorance passes into its opposite and becomes Inquiry. It seems therefore that there is in dialogue a kind of dialectic which involves a process of movement which may be defined as 'passing into opposite'. But as we distinguished between ignorance

and ignorance, between question and question, between seeing and seeing, so we must distinguish between dialectic and dialectic: For, there is a dialectic which distinguishes between opposites and leaves opposites *as* opposites, and a dialectic which says, *neti, neti*, 'not-this', 'not-this' and passes *beyond* opposites. This is a dialectic in which the notion of truth is 'Comprehension' and is not 'Either-Or'. A characteristic of this dialectical movement is that it is *self-directed*; as such, it is not involved in a regress.

Now, the self-directed, dialectical movement is a movement of *self-transcendence*, a movement in which what moves transcends or goes beyond itself, and its *end* is to keep going on as such; therefore *That* or the Reality that is involved in its own transcendence is described in the Upanisads, not as 'the highest' but as 'higher than the highest' *aksarāt paratah parah*. If this is the case, then, the 'beginning' of the movement of self-transcendence is like its 'end', self-transcendence.

2. Here is a passage from the Fourth Brahmana of the First Chapter of the *Bṛihad-Āraṇyaka* Upanisad which illustrates the self-directed dialectic of self-transcendence.

'In the beginning this (world) was only the self, (*atma*) in the shape of a person (*purusa*). Looking around he saw nothing else than the self. He first said, 'I am'. Therefore arose the name of I. Therefore, even to this day when one is addressed he says first 'This is I' and then speaks whatever other name he may have . . . '.

'He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid. This one then thought to himself, 'since there is nothing else than myself, of what am I afraid?' There upon his fear, verily, passed away, for, of what should he have been afraid? Assuredly, it is from a second that fear arises'.

‘He, verily had no delight. Therefore one who is alone has no delight. He desired a second . . .’.

(1) *ātmaivedam agra āsīt puruṣavidah,
so’nuvīksya nānyad ātmano’pasyat,
so’ham asmīty agre vyāharat;
tato’ham nāma bhavat, tasmād apy etarhy aman-
tritah;*

*aham ayam ity evāgra uktvā,
athānyam nāma prabrūte yad asya bhavati . . .*

(2) *so’bibhet, tasmād ekākī bibheti,
sa hāyam īkṣām cakre, yan mad anyan nāsti,
kaṣmān nu bihemiti, tata evāsyā bhayam viyaya
kasmād hy abhesyat, dvitīyād vai bhayam bhavati.*

(3) *sa vai naiva reme; tasmād ekākī na ramate;
sa dvitīyam aicchat; . . .*

3. Now, this passage seems to entail a distinction between ‘what a thing *is*’ and ‘what a thing *has*’, between what the Universe *is*, and what the Universe *has*: The Upanisad uses two different symbols to indicate the distinction, *ātma* and *puruṣa*. The Universe or the World *is* *ātma*, and what *is* as *ātma* *has* a ‘Form’, the ‘shape’ of a Person, *puruṣa*. This passage distinguishes between Being *as* Being and Form that Being *has*: Being *is* *prior* to Form; for, we can think of Being without thinking of Form but we cannot think of Form without thinking of Being. In speaking of the Universe through the symbol of a Person *puruṣa*, this passage *personifies* the Universe; Or, Man is universalised: *puruṣa eva idam sarvam*, as the *Puruṣa-Sukta* of the *Rg-Veda* says. But when the Upanisad says that the Universe *has* the ‘shape’ of a Person it is not saying that it has hands or feet or that it is speaking of a member of a class.

Now, the Philosophy of Indian Culture is not interested in the ‘origin’ of the Universe or in the ‘origin’ of

Man. It is interested in the question, *What* is Man or *What* is the Universe; and when it says, 'In the beginning this world was only the Self, *ātma* in the shape of a person *purusa*', it is not inquiring into the 'origin' of the World or of Man. Instead, it assumes a one-one correspondence between the Macrocosm and the Microcosm. To know *What* the world is we have to know *what* Man is, or to know what Man is we have to know what the Universe is; for, both are Being *in the same sense*: And neither Man nor the Universe is a 'Thing' but a 'Person'.

4. Now, this passage is in the third person singular and reads like a *report*; it reads like the report of a *witness* or observer to a dialogue that had gone on in another person or the person who was involved in a dialogue with himself had *reported* to the witness what had gone on in him. Are there two, a person in whom the dialogue was going on, and another who was a witness of it?

Secondly, the passage is in the past tense and reads like a record of what had happened in the past: 'In the beginning this World *was* only the Self'. The use of the past tense is consistent with the idea of a witness that the passage suggests. But the past tense 'was' is the 'timeless' sense of was: It 'was' in the sense that it 'never was not': This world *never was not Self*: There never was 'a time' when the world was not Self: i.e. there was *no* 'beginning' to the being of the World as the Self.

Now, the use of the third person singular and the use of the past tense are only dialectical devices to introduce the notion of an authentic witness who reports, as it were, what he had seen or what, as it were, had happened; because, the notion of truth involves the notion of an authentic witness who bears credible testimony to what, as if it were, had happened. The notion of a

witness and the use of the past tense seem to imply that truth ought to be from the error of 'subjectivism'.

5. The passage says, 'Looking around he saw nothing else than the Self: He first said, 'I am'. 'I am' is Unity of Being and Awareness. But Being is not *inferred* from Awareness as is the case in Descartes: 'I think, therefore, I am'. Being is Awareness, but Awareness of What? The self awareness of the Delight of Being: Therefore there is no *sat* which is not *chit*, and no *sat* which is *chit* which is not *ānanda*.

6. Being is both what 'is' and what 'arises'. What is it that 'arises'? The 'I': 'Therefore *arose* the name of I'. If there is a distinction between what 'is' and what 'arises', then, there is a distinction between 'I' which 'arises' and its *Source* which *is*. If so, is the Source of the 'I', 'I'? No.

The passage says that the 'I' is a *Name*: What *arises* is a Name. If that which arises is a Name, then, that from which it arises is *No-Name*. The *Name* 'I' arises from No-Name: The 'I' arises from 'No-I'.

The *Name* 'I' is not Being *as* Being but a *limitation* of Being, a limitation of Awareness and a limitation of Being.

But the 'I' is a *Name* which has *other* names: e.g. 'I am 'so-and-so': Therefore when one is addressed he says first 'This is I' and then speaks out other names he has: Only what has a Name has other names, and what has Name has Form and what has Form has a Name.

Indeed, Name is the same as Form. God has no Form because He has no Name. Therefore the principle of Individuality is in *a* Being who has no Name or Form. Man's true individuality is in the Upanisads, also, a loosening of Name and Form, *vidvān nāma rupād vimuktah*.

7. The 'I am' is a Unity of Being and Awareness. But there is no Unity of Being and Awareness without delight, without delight of Being.

Now, delight of Being is a negation of negation. It is negation of a 'Second' from whom fear arises. The negation of the 'Second' from whom fear arises leaves the 'Alone', Alone, and without a 'Second'. This is one sense only of the notion of Absolute Being. Freedom from fear is necessary but not sufficient. In Absolute Being which is free from fear there is yet a deficiency. The deficiency is that there is no joy, no delight. The one Alone may be the Supreme but has it delight? This is the question involved in Being. 'To be' is not only 'to be free from fear' but to *enjoy* Delight of Being. Being is, no doubt, freedom, but Delight of Being is 'greater than' (to use a phrase from the *Bhūma-Vidya* of the Upanisad) 'freedom from', freedom from fear. Therefore Delight of Being is a negation of the negation. It is a negation of the 'Alone' who has negated a 'Second' from whom fear arises. The negation of the negation is 'desire' for a 'Second'. The 'Alone', the One without a Second, loses by its own choice and freedom its Aloneness. And yet it loses not its Absoluteness: For, this apparent *movement* of losing itself in a 'Second' is another aspect of Its Absoluteness.

8. It is significant that Delight of Being involves desire or is involved in desire *kama*. This is indeed the case. Delight of Being is a negation of negation. Desire that is involved in Delight of Being is also a negation of negation. If desirelessness is a negation of desire, then, the negation of the negation is Desire, which is neither 'desire' nor 'desirelessness'. At this point we seem to have made a discovery: There is in the Philosophy of Indian Culture an antithesis between 'desire' and

‘desirelessness’ but there is an antithesis also between ‘Desire’ and ‘desire’. And the same symbol *Kama* is used for both. If so, is Desire a *purushartha*? In ‘desiring a Second’, is *purusa* involved in a *purushartha*? ‘Desire’ is involved in Creation: *prajapati prajā Kāmah*, The Lord was desirous of creatures. Desire is an ‘original’ impulse, an impulse from ‘Above’; whereas, ‘desire’ is ‘want’ whether to have what you have not, or to possess what you possess. But the desire *not* to possess possession or not to possess the ‘possessor’ is ‘Desire’ of another sort. It is Desire for liberation. But liberation is Desire *from* the Desire for Liberation.

But it seems that Delight of Being is a Desire *for* a ‘Second’. It is Desire of the ‘Alone’ *not* to be Alone. As such, it is *like* the desire *not* to possess what you possess. But it is not a *Refusal*. Delight of Being is not a Refusal but a Renunciation. It is not a Refusal to attain, to possess, to accomplish but a Renunciation of what is attained and what is possessed. The ‘Alone’ renounces ‘Aloneness’ after having attained ‘Aloneness’. For, delight of Being is ‘greater than’ being ‘Alone’ and ‘greater than’ being One without a Second. Delight of Being is the apparent paradox of ‘enjoying through renunciation’. Delight of Being is a PLAY of self-transcendence of Being. Delight of Being is not *static* Being. It is an apparent dialectical movement which, first, affirms its Aloneness or Absoluteness and then negates this. It is, first, a distinction between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’, and then a negation or transcendence of the distinction, and both aspects of the *movement* (for the passage from the Upanisad implies an apparent movement) are in the ‘Now’ of a simultaneity: So it is significant that the Upanisads should use no word or description but use Lightening as a symbol.



